Modeling and analysis of collective management of water resources by Tilmant, A. et al.
Modeling and analysis of collective management of
water resources
A. Tilmant, P. Van Der Zaag, P. Fortemps
To cite this version:
A. Tilmant, P. Van Der Zaag, P. Fortemps. Modeling and analysis of collective management
of water resources. Hydrology and Earth System Sciences Discussions, European Geosciences
Union, 2006, 3 (5), pp.2707-2733. <hal-00298764>
HAL Id: hal-00298764
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00298764
Submitted on 4 Sep 2006
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
HESSD
3, 2707–2733, 2006
Operation of
reservoir resources
A. Tilmant et al.
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
J I
J I
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Printer-friendly Version
Interactive Discussion
EGU
Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., 3, 2707–2733, 2006
www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci-discuss.net/3/2707/2006/
© Author(s) 2006. This work is licensed
under a Creative Commons License.
Hydrology and
Earth System
Sciences
Discussions
Papers published in Hydrology and Earth System Sciences Discussions are under
open-access review for the journal Hydrology and Earth System Sciences
Modeling and analysis of collective
management of water resources
A. Tilmant1, P. van der Zaag2, and P. Fortemps3
1UNESCO-IHE, Department of Management and Institution, Delft, The Netherlands
2Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands
3Faculte´ Polytechnique de Mons, Department of Applied Mathematics and Operational
Research, Mons, Belgium
Received: 4 July 2006 – Accepted: 17 August 2006 – Published: 4 September 2006
Correspondence to: A. Tilmant (a.tilmant@unesco-ihe.org)
2707
HESSD
3, 2707–2733, 2006
Operation of
reservoir resources
A. Tilmant et al.
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
J I
J I
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Printer-friendly Version
Interactive Discussion
EGU
Abstract
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) recommends, among other things,
that the management of water resources systems be carried out at the lowest appro-
priate level in order to increase the transparency, acceptability and efficiency of the
decision-making process. Empowering water users and stakeholders transforms the5
decision-making process by enlarging the number of point of views that must be con-
sidered as well as the set of rules through which decisions are taken. This paper
investigates the impact of different group decision-making approaches on the operat-
ing policies of a water resource. To achieve this, the water resource allocation problem
is formulated as an optimization problem which seeks to maximize the aggregated10
satisfaction of various water users corresponding to different approaches to collective
choice, namely the utilitarian and the egalitarian ones. The optimal operating policies
are then used in simulation and compared. The concepts are illustrated with a multipur-
pose reservoir in Chile. The analysis of simulation results reveals that if this reservoir
were to be managed by its water users, both approaches to collective choice would15
yield significantly different operating policies. The paper concludes that the transfer of
management to water users must be carefully implemented if a reasonable trade-off
between equity and efficiency is to be achieved.
1 Introduction
The management of large-scale water resources, such as multipurpose reservoirs,20
has traditionally been carried out by public administration. The motivations for a public
management are both political and financial: to promote equity and arbitrate conflicts
among water users, to maintain ownership on a strategic infrastructure, to ensure that
certain water services viewed as public goods are preserved, and to promote the de-
velopment of water resources which are highly capital intensive with long time invest-25
ments (Dinar et al., 1997). As pointed out recently by various authors (Hjorth et al.,
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1998; WCD, 2000) the performance of many multipurpose schemes has not met the
expected targets. Consequently, a (partial) transfer of management to water users is
often cited as a potential alternative to a public (centrally-organized) administration.
This paper investigates the impacts of different approaches to collective choice on
the management of a water resource system. More specifically, an optimization model5
is developed to determines optimal release policies for a multipurpose reservoir while
explicitly considering multiple water users and different group decision-making ap-
proaches. The model seeks to maximize the aggregated satisfaction of the different
water users and relies on flexible constraints to quantitatively model preferences for-
mulated by the water users. The use of flexible constraints instead of objective func-10
tions is motivated by the fact that a flexible constraint includes a threshold below which
a solution will be rejected and a threshold above which solutions are equally feasible
(Dubois et al., 1996). In other words, between these two thresholds, the flexible con-
straint behaves as a local objective. In addition, flexible constraints also remove barrier
language for non-technical water users since they can be described by linguistic vari-15
ables and mathematically encoded as fuzzy sets. The idea here is that fuzzy sets are
used as a vehicle to capture and process linguistically described water users’ prefer-
ences formulated by both technical and non-technical water users. In this paper, the
terms “stakeholder”, “water user”, “actor” and “objective” play the same role: supplying
preferences across alternatives. They can therefore be used interchangeably.20
The optimal decision is defined as the solution for which the global satisfaction of
the different water users is maximal. An aggregation of water users’ preferences is
therefore needed and must be carried out taking into account the complex rules that
characterize the group decision-making. This paper illustrates the impact of these de-
cision rules on the performance of a multipurpose reservoir as if it were managed by25
the water users. The second section is devoted to flexible constraints and objectives.
Section three presents various flexible constraints satisfaction problems and how they
can be interpreted in social choice theory. Then, the optimization of reservoir operation
is discussed in section four and the case study introduced in section five. Simulation re-
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sults associated to various group decision-making approaches are analyzed in section
six. Finally, concluding remarks are presented.
2 Flexible constraints versus objectives
Many water resources systems have been developed and managed to meet the de-
mands for water formulated by multiple users, some of them with multiple objectives.5
Unfortunately, these objectives can seldom be fully satisfied due to the presence of
various constraints, which can be of physical, legal or financial nature. The major dif-
ference between constraints and objectives comes from the imperativeness with which
they must be satisfied: satisfying a constraint is more imperative than satisfying an
objective (Slany, 1996). An objective function, on the other hand, associates to each10
alternative (or solution) r a value g(r) so as to provide a complete ranking of the set
of feasible solutions: r g r ′ if and only if g(r)≥g(r ′), which means “the objective g
prefers r to r ′”.
The notion of flexible (fuzzy) constraint is an attempt to represent both constraints
and objectives by fuzzy sets. Let < be the set of all solutions (feasible, non-feasible or15
partially feasible) and O a fuzzy relation related to the constraint C. A flexible constraint
C can be described by a fuzzy set defined by O in <. For a solution r ∈ <, the mem-
bership grade µO(r) associated by O to r specifies the satisfaction level of r according
to the constraint C:
µO(r)=1. means r totally satisfies C20
µO(r)∈]0,1[. means r partially satisfies C
µO(r)=0. means r totally violates C
µO(r)≥µO(r ′). means r is preferred to r ′
For a classical constraint, the relation O is binary, whereas for a flexible constraint,
O is a fuzzy relation. In other words, O is the fuzzy set of solutions more or less25
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satisfying the flexible constraint C. The relation O therefore rank-orders the feasible
solutions like an objective function. But the flexible constraint differs from the objective
function in that it also models a threshold below which a solution will be rejected and
a threshold above which solutions are equally feasible. In a sense, a flexible constraint
can be viewed as the association of a constraint and a criterion; the former defines the5
support of the flexible constraint, while the latter rank-orders the solutions according to
preferences (Dubois et al., 1996).
The methodology described in this paper heavily relies on preferences formulated
by water users. These preferences will be encoded as fuzzy sets in the optimization
algorithm. More specifically, the membership grade µ translate water user satisfaction10
on the unit interval: the membership grade is 1 when the alternative completely satis-
fies the water user, and it is equal to 0 when the solution is completely rejected by the
same water user. In the ]0, 1[ interval, solutions are partially accepted/rejected. Note
that the term satisfaction has a logical meaning here: to “satisfy” a preference means
that the prior conditions defining the preference are met. This definition has therefore15
no psychological sense in that it does not reflect a mental state of pleasure.
3 Flexible constraint satisfaction problems
Classical Constraint Satisfaction Problems (CSP) rely on “crisp” (hard) constraints: con-
straints can either be satisfied or not. In CSP, a solution must satisfy all constraints of
the problem. A problem is said to be “underconstrained” if it accepts more than one20
solution. In that case, the decision maker has to consider other constraints to differ-
entiate between these solutions. In contrast, when there is no solution, the problem is
said to be “overconstrained” and one or more constraints must be relaxed. The Flexi-
ble Constraint Satisfaction Problem (FCSP) generalizes CSP by substituting at least one
hard constraint by a flexible constraint. In a sense, this allows the decision maker to25
introduce an objective function in the problem, which can be used to relax an “overcon-
strained” problem, or to differentiate the solutions of an “underconstrained” problem.
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Define C as a finite set of flexible constraints {C1, C2, . . . , CJ}, O as a finite set of
fuzzy relations {O1, O2, . . . , OJ} and r as an alternative (r ∈ <). Each alternative r is
associated with a profile µr=(µO1(r), µO2(r), . . . , µOJ (r)) ∈ [0,1]
J , where µOj (r) is the
satisfaction level of the j th flexible constraint associated with the alternative r .
To rank the alternatives or select an alternative that best satisfies the flexible con-5
straints, one can compute the global scores D(r) from the profile of any alternative r
using an aggregation satisfaction D : RJ→R. In classical constraint satisfaction prob-
lem, the most common definition of the aggregated satisfaction D is based on the
minimum operator (the min-ordering):
D(r) = µO1∩O2∩...∩OJ (r) = minCj∈C
µOj (r) (1)10
The minimum operator belongs to a family of operators called triangular norms which
have interesting mathematical properties (Zimmermann, 1991).
The best solutions r∗ are therefore those for which the aggregated satisfaction D is
maximum:
r∗ = max
r∈<
min
Cj∈C
µOj (r) (2)15
The solutions r∗ maximize the satisfaction level of the least satisfied constraint, and
therefore the FCSP is a max-min optimization problem (max-min solutions). The use of
the min operator has been advocated by (Bellman and Zadeh, 1970). They adopted
a logic point of view, interpreting the intersection of two fuzzy sets (which is obtained
by combining with the min operator their membership grade functions) as the “logical20
AND” between two statements. It must be pointed out that this max-min approach is
coherent with the properties of a flexible constraint, namely it cannot be violated. Any
solution with a zero satisfaction level for a single constraint is rejected as impossible.
In social choice theory, the min-ordering corresponds to an egalitarian approach:
every member (water user) has a veto power like the permanent members of the UN25
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Security council. As soon as one user rejects a solution, it is globally rejected by the
whole group.
Despite its pleasing mathematical properties, the min-ordering has two major draw-
backs:
– it lacks of discrimination power by concentrating on the worst aspects of the alter-5
natives;
– maxmin solutions are not Pareto optimal, meaning that the satisfaction of other
water users could still be improved without deteriorating the satisfaction of the
least-satisfied water user.
The first issue has been addressed by several authors, e.g. (Dubois et al., 1996;10
Dubois and Fortemps, 1999), who have proposed various refinements such as the
leximin or the discrimin orderings. The second drawback has a practical dimension; the
fact that Pareto optimality cannot be guaranteed implies that certain water users will not
easily accept the solutions since the resource is not efficiently managed. However, as
the solutions are taken on the basis of the least-satisfied water user, they are consistent15
with the notion of justice as discussed by Rawls (1970).
An alternative definition of the aggregated satisfaction D is based on the maximum
operator. It represents a group decision-making in which each participant is a potential
dictator (max-ordering). Here, as soon as a water user is fully satisfied with a solution,
it is accepted by the whole group. In other words, this approach looks for the full20
satisfaction of at least one water user, nothwithstanding the satisfaction of the other
users. Then the optimal solutions are the solutions of a maximax optimization problems
(max-max solutions). However, the max-ordering suffers from the same drawbacks as
the min-ordering.
In between these two extremes the utilitarian decision-making approach builds an25
additive satisfaction D using, for example, a sum over all preferences. The solutions
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with the highest utility are the ones preferred (max-sum solutions):
r∗ = max
r∈<
∑
j
µOj (r) (3)
In contrast to max-min or max-max solutions, max-sum solutions are consistent with
the tradition of multicriteria decision making and the idea of trade-off.
The utilitarian approach to collective choice also often implies that the actors, and5
thus their constraints, do no have the same importance. For example, diverting water
for municipal water supply may be more important than for irrigation purposes. If a
constraint is more important, it should play a more significant role in the aggregation
function (Eq. 3). Various methods exist for including relative importance. Here, the
constraints are ordered with respect to each other by giving them a priority degree,10
which can be considered as a weight. From pairwise comparisons between constraints,
it is possible to determine the weights using a procedure developed by Saaty (1980).
This procedure starts with the construction of a J×J matrix A in which the element
ai j gives the relative importance of the constraint Ci with respect to the constraint Cj .
Note that the element aj i is calculated from aj i=1/ai j . Table 1 lists the values of aj i15
and their definitions. The weight vector w is then obtained from
Aw = λmaxw (4)
where λmax is the maximum eigenvalue of A. This vector is the importance associated
with each of the constraints Cj for j ∈ [1, 2, . . . , J ]. More details about this methodol-
ogy can be found in Saaty (1980).20
We further assume that the weight factors are normalized according to∑
j
wj = 1, wj ∈ [0,1]. (5)
Once the weight vector is calculated, it can be introduced in the definition of the utili-
tarian, aggregated, satisfaction D by, for example, directly multiplying the satisfaction
2714
HESSD
3, 2707–2733, 2006
Operation of
reservoir resources
A. Tilmant et al.
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
J I
J I
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Printer-friendly Version
Interactive Discussion
EGU
level µOj by its weight wj . The optimization problem (Eq. 3) becomes the well-known
weighted sum:
Dp(r) =
∑
j
wjµOj (r) (6)
The weighted sum is, in turn, a particular case of the generalized averaging operator
when the parameter p=1 (Kaymak and van Nauta Lemke, 1998)5
Dp(r) = {
∑
j
wjµ
p
Oj
(r)}1/p , p ∈ \{0} (7)
and
D0(r) =
∏
j
µOj (r)
wj (8)
As a matter of fact, when p→∞ the aggregation function (Eq. 7) becomes equiva-
lent to the max-operator, whereas when p→−∞ the aggregation is equivalent to the10
min-opeator. In between these two extremes, the aggregation Function (7) can be tai-
lored to model utilitarian decision-making. With the aggregation Function (7), the best
solution rp,∗ of the FCSP is given by
rp,∗ = max
r∈<
{
∑
j
wjµ
p
Oj
(r)}1/p, p ∈ \{0} (9)
and15
r0,∗ = max
r∈<
∏
j
µOj (r)
wj (10)
As mentioned early, the aggregation should also produce Pareto-optimal solutions.
Utilitarian solutions (i.e solutions corresponding to finite values of p in Eq. 9) are all
Pareto optimal, but notwithstanding this fact, these solutions might not necessarily be
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well perceived by water users since compensation between water users’ satisfaction
is assumed. In other words, a consensus might be difficult to reach, because certain
water users might consider the resulting operating policy as a “zero-sum” game, while
others might see it as a “positive-sum” game. It must be stressed here that the utilitarian
and egalitarian conceptions of collective choice assume that:5
– decision makers will choose among alternatives by articulating prior preferences;
– disagreement is the result of competition for the use of water.
The first assumption is often criticized by political scientists, because it fails to ad-
equately take into account those water services that can be viewed as public goods
(Sagoff, 1998): a typical example is flood control. In other words, these two concep-10
tions only deal with “consumer” (water user) preferences and not “citizen” preferences.
4 Reservoir operation optimization
The different group decision-making approaches discussed in the previous section and
their impacts on the management of a water resources are illustrated with a multipur-
pose reservoir operation problem. The reservoir operation problem typically consists15
in determining release decisions that should be made in order to meet the demands
formulated by various water users/uses such as hydropower generation, flood control,
low flow maintenance, recreation, irrigation, etc. Various models have been developed
in the past to address this operation problem. Deterministic models use a specific se-
quence of streamflows to determine operating policies. Stochastic models like stochas-20
tic dynamic programming (SDP), on the other hand, rely on statistical descriptions of
the streamflow and forecast process to obtain operating policies. Labadie (2004) has
recently carried out a review of these techniques.
In Stochastic Dynamic Programming SDP, release decisions are made to maximize
(minimize) current benefits (costs) plus the expected benefits (costs) from future op-25
eration, which are represented by the recursively calculated cost-to-go function F ∗. In
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reservoir operation studies, the most common state variables are the volume of wa-
ter in the reservoirs and a description of current hydrologic conditions (Tejada-Guibert
et al., 1995). Let n be the number of stages remaining until the end of the planning
horizon, rt be the release during period t, at the inflow during period t, st the storage
at the beginning of time period t, E the expectation operator, α the discount factor, and5
gt the benefit of system operation during period t.
Considering the reservoir operation problem as periodic and infinite-horizon the long-
term optimal operating policy can be found by the recursive solution of the functional
SDP equation
F ∗n (st, at) = maxrt
{gt(st, at, rt)10
+ E
at+1 |at
αF ∗n−1(st+1, at+1)} (11)
subject to
max[rmin, st + at − smax] ≤ rt ≤ min[rmax, st + at − smin] (12)
where smin and smax are the lower and upper bounds on storage, rmin and rmax are the
lower and upper bounds on release.15
The recursive Eq. (11) is carried out until the change in the cost-to-go function from
one iteration to the next becomes nearly constant for each point of the discrete state
space domain (Loucks and van Beek, 2005). In this study, the time span of a stage is
one month, and the period is one year. In practice, to solve the SDP model (Eq. 11),
the hydrologic state and the storage variables must be discretized into na and ns in-20
tervals, respectively, each represented by a characteristic value (Yakowitz, 1982). The
continuous domain (at, st) is thus replaced by a grid so that an approximate solution of
(Eq. 11) can be developed by evaluating (Eq. 11) at the grid points only. Here, 12 grids
of 110 points are used (na=5 and ns=22). When the algorithm moves from one stage
(e.g. n−1) to the next (e.g. n), the values of Fn−1 are available only at the grid points.25
In this study, the release decisions are determined from a variant of SDP in which the
objective function of the recursive equation is no longer an economic one, but rather
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corresponds to a FCSP in which the flexible constraints encode the satisfaction levels
of the different water users and objectives. It must be stressed here that the physical
constraints are still modeled by hard constraints. Denote µOj,t (st, at, rt) as the satisfac-
tion of the j th water user/objective at time t when the storage is st, the inflow is at and
the decision is rt. Let wj,t be the relative importance of the j th water user/objective at5
time t with
∑
j
wj,t=1. In addition, let Dn(st, at) be the expected satisfaction-to-go from
the optimal operation of the system from the current period t (n remaining stages) to
the end of the planning horizon given that the system’s state in period t is (st, at). The
steady-state release policies are found by solution of:
D∗n(st, at) =
[maxrt{
∑J−1
j=1 ωj,tµ
p
Oj,t
(st, at, rt)+∑
at+1
ρ(at+1 | at)ωJ,tD∗
p
n−1(st+1, at+1)}]p
−1
(13)
10
where ρ(.) are flow transition probabilities estimated from historical flow records.
Similar approaches can be found in (Fontane et al., 1997; Esogbue and Kaprzyk,
1998; Tilmant et al., 2002b) to derive operating policies of multipurpose reservoirs with
imprecise operating objectives. A comparison between FSDP and SDP derived policies
is described in (Tilmant et al., 2002a).15
In this study, the so-called Flexible SDP (FSDP) functional Eq. (13) will be used to
derive reservoir operating policies corresponding to different group decision-making
approaches as encountered in social choice theory. Several FSDP models will be de-
veloped with p=1, p→∞ and p→−∞ to determine optimal release decisions and then
simulate the operation of the multipurpose reservoir with these three different rules.20
Meaningful performance indicators, such as the reliability in meeting irrigation water
demands, will then be estimated from simulation results and used to compare the three
FSDP formulations corresponding to three different conceptions of collective choice.
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5 Case study
The Colbu`n reservoir in Chile is used to illustrate the impact of different decision-
making approaches on the performance of a water resource. This reservoir is located
in the Maule river basin near Santiago. Water in the basin was used primarily for irriga-
tion and more recently for hydropower generation. The development of hydropower has5
been a source of tension between irrigators and the hydropower companies because:
– the operation of the hydropower plants affects the hydrological regime therefore
violating the prior rights of farmers for constant flows;
– water diverted for hydropower generation does not immediately return to the river
therefore bypassing many farmers.10
To mitigate the impact on farmers, hydropower companies have constructed addi-
tional hydraulic infrastructures (irrigation offtakes, canals). This has had practical impli-
cations for the management of the Colbu`n reservoir as the elevation of a major irrigation
canal imposes a lower limit on the storage level therefore reducing the usable storage
capacity by as much as 30% (from 1515hm3 to 950 hm3). In addition, hydropower15
companies are also bound to respect pre-defined monthly release targets reflecting
agricultural demands. Consequently, the number of objectives J for the Colbu`n reser-
voir is four: (1) hydropower generation, (2) storage control for flood prevention during
the high flow season and lateral irrigation during the low flow season, (3) downstream
irrigation, and (4) the need to ensure satisfactory continuing operation, i.e. to avoid fu-20
ture shortfalls in any of the first three operating objectives. Table 2 lists the objectives
and their associated control/state variables.
The general FSDP model for the Colbu`n reservoir can be written as:
D∗n(st, at) =
[maxrt{
∑3
j=1ωj,tµ
p
Oj,t
(st, at, rt)+∑
at+1
ρ(at+1 | at)ω4,tD∗
p
n−1(st+1, at+1)}]p
−1
(14)
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with the same restrictions on the state and decision variables as in Eq. (11). The
membership functions µOj and weighting coefficients ωi were derived from existing
operating rules as well as from discussions with experts familiar with the system. Note
that the membership function for the hydropower objective is the production function
normalized on the unit interval.5
As mentioned above, this formulation is implemented with three different aggregation
operators corresponding to utilitarian or egalitarian approaches to collective choice.
There are therefore three FSDP models as listed in Table 4.
The FSDP-MODEL I corresponds to the egalitarian approach to group decision-
making in which each water user has a veto power. As pointed out early, this ap-10
proach is also the most equitable as the decision maximizes the satisfaction of the
least-satisfied water user.
D∗n(st, at) =
maxrt minµ,D{µOj,t (st, at, rt), . . . ,∑
at+1
ρ(at+1 | at)D∗n−1(st+1, at+1)}
(15)
The FSDP-MODEL II corresponds to the utilitarian approach to group decision-making
in which each water user no longer has a veto power but where their relative impor-15
tance is now considered. Here, the optimal solutions r∗(st, at) are all Pareto optimal
and compensation between high and low satisfaction degrees is now permitted, which
implies that most water users will perceive these solutions as a ’‘zero-sum” game.
D∗n(st, at) =
maxrt{
∑3
j=1ωj,tµOj,t (st, at, rt)+∑
at+1
ρ(at+1 | at)ω4,tD∗n−1(st+1, at+1)}
(16)
Finally, the FSDP-MODEL III corresponds to the egalitarian approach to group decision-20
making in which each water user is a potential dictator. Although not desirable, this
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approach is considered here for comparison purposes.
D∗n(st, at) =
maxrt maxµ,D{µOj,t (st, at, rt), . . . ,∑
at+1
ρ(at+1 | at)D∗n−1(st+1, at+1)}
(17)
FSDP-derived operating rules are then used in simulation. Simulation results consist
of the end-of-the month storage level, the monthly release through the turbines, the
losses, and the average monthly hydroelectric production. Each simulation run starts5
with initial volume in storage of 1449 hm3 and uses historical monthly inflows recorded
during the 1988–2000 period.
6 Simulation results
The performance indicators that are used to investigate the impact of the different group
decision-making approaches on the performance of the Colbu`n reservoir are10
– the reliability in meeting downstream irrigation demands δ=P (st≥sT ) where sT is
the minimum allowable storage volume for lateral irrigation
– the reliability in delivering water for lateral irrigation β = P (rt≥dt) where dt is the
target release for downstream irrigation in period t
– (iii) the average annual production of hydroelectricity γ.15
Simulated performances corresponding to the three FSDP models and to the ‘’88–”00
time period are listed in Table 5.
The examination of Table 5 and Fig. 2 reveals that the three conceptions of collec-
tive choice yield different release policies. The egalitarian approach with dictatorship
tend to favor high releases therefore lowering the volume in storage. The reason is to20
be found in that this conception of collective choice concentrates on the satisfaction
of the most satisfied decision maker, which is here either the hydropower company or
2721
HESSD
3, 2707–2733, 2006
Operation of
reservoir resources
A. Tilmant et al.
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
J I
J I
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Printer-friendly Version
Interactive Discussion
EGU
downstream farmers whose satisfaction degrees µO1 are in general larger than that of
the two other objectives (µO1 , µO3>µO2 , µO4) because hydropower generation increases
more rapidly with the release term rather that with the head term. The opposite behav-
ior is observed with the egalitarian approach with veto power. As a matter of fact,
this approach encourages high pool elevation throughout the year as both the lateral5
irrigation and future operation objectives are likely to be the least satisfied objectives
if aggressive release are implemented to meet downstream irrigation water demands
and the production of hydroelectricity.
In between these two extremes, the utilitarian approach generates more balanced
release policies, which is consistent with the fact that trade-offs are now considered10
between aggressive and conservative objectives. This approach explicitly recognizes
that high satisfaction levels can compensate lower satisfaction levels in order to de-
rive a policy that compromises between the two extreme egalitarian approaches to
collective choice. The simulation results speak for themselves: (i) the storage levels
corresponding to the utilitarian approach lie often somewhere in between the storage15
levels corresponding to the two egalitarian approaches, and (ii) this is confirmed by the
performance indicators as (δI<δI I<δI I I ) and (βI>βI I>βI I I ). The same observation can
be made for the average annual production of hydroelectricity (with γI>γI I>γI I I ). The
third model generates more energy because it better exploits the volume in storage
with a drawdown/refill cycle that takes place over the entire reservoir.20
In practice, the proposed methodology can be seen as a loop in which, on one
hand, waters users provide their preferences and, on the other hand, these preferences
are processed by the FSDP model which then provides water users with short and
long-term consequences. These consequences must be easily interpreted by water
users thanks to the use of several indicators such as satisfaction, reliability, resiliency,25
economic performance (costs vs. benefits, value-at-risk, cashflow-at-risk), etc. The
interpretation should then encourage discussion between water users and ultimately
generates a new set of preferences, and thus a new loop in Fig. 3, which would lead to
consensual solutions.
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7 Conclusions
This paper illustrates the impact of various conceptions of collective choice on the
performance of a water resource system. The group decision-making process is math-
ematically formulated as a flexible constraint satisfaction problem which assumes both
quantification and commensurability of preferences. From these demanding assump-5
tions, an aggregation operator must be carefully selected to identify consensual solu-
tions. Results show that extreme conceptions of collective choice, i.e. veto-power and
dictatorship, generate extreme release policies. Utilitarian approaches appear to be
more consistent even though compensatory effects between low and high satisfaction
levels are not easily accepted by water users.10
The proposed model can provide some insights into how the decision-making pro-
cess will affect current and future allocations and ultimately the satisfaction of the users.
Various risk indicators can also be derived from long-term simulations which capture
the inherent uncertainties attached to this water resource management problem. The
model can also be used to arbitrate between efficiency and equity principles for allo-15
cating water among competing users.
Potential refinements include (i) the improvement of aggregation operators, (ii) the
consideration of “public” water services, i.e. the operating objectives that can be
viewed as public goods (e.g. flood control) and their aggregation with “individual” ob-
jectives (e.g. hydropower, navigation), and (iii) the elicitation of preferences. Further20
researches will concentrate on other decentralized allocation mechanisms such as ca-
pacity sharing (Tilmant and van der Zaag, 2006).
References
Bellman, R. and Zadeh, L.: Decision-making in a fuzzy environment, Manage. Sci., 17, 141–
164, 1970. 271225
2723
HESSD
3, 2707–2733, 2006
Operation of
reservoir resources
A. Tilmant et al.
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
J I
J I
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Printer-friendly Version
Interactive Discussion
EGU
Dinar, A., Rosegrant, M., and Meinzen-Dick, R.: Water allocation mechanisms: Principles and
examples, World Bank Technical Paper, 1997. 2708
Dubois, D. and Fortemps, P.: Computing improved optimal solutions to max-min flexible con-
straint satisfaction problems, Eur. J. Operational Res., 118, 95–126, 1999. 2713
Dubois, D., Fargier, H., and Prade, H.: Refinements of the maximin approach to decision-5
making in a fuzzy environement, Fuzzy sets and systems, 81, 103–122, 1996. 2709, 2711,
2713
Esogbue, A. and Kaprzyk, J.: Fuzzy dynamic programming, in: Handbook of fuzzy sets series,
vol. 5, 281–307, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1998. 2718
Fontane, D., Gates, T., and Moncada, E.: Planning reservoir operation with imprecise objec-10
tives, J. Water Resour. Plann. Manage., 123, 154–163, 1997. 2718
Hjorth, P., Kundzewicz, W., Kutchment, L., and Rosbjerg, D.: Critiques of present reservoirs,
in: Sustainable Reservoir Development and Management, edited by nbr 251, I. P., 125–247,
Wallingford, UK, 1998. 2708
Kaymak, U. and van Nauta Lemke, H.: A sensitivity analysis approach to introducing weight15
factors into decision functions in fuzzy multicriteria decision making, Fuzzy sets and systems,
97, 169–182, 1998. 2715
Labadie, J. W.: Optimal operation of multireservoir systems: State-of-the-Art review, J. Water
Resour. Plann. Manage., 130, 93–111, 2004. 2716
Loucks, D. and van Beek, E.: Water resources systems planning and management, UNESCO20
Publishing, Paris, France, 2005. 2717
Rawls, J.: A theory of Justice, Cambridge University Press, Mass, USA, 1970. 2713
Saaty, T.: The analytic hierarchy process, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1980. 2714
Sagoff, M.: Aggregation and deliberation in valuing environmental public goods: A look beyond
contingent pricing, Ecol. Economics, 24, 213–230, 1998. 271625
Slany, W.: Scheduling as a fuzzy multiple criteria optimization problem, Fuzzy sets and sys-
tems, 78, 197–222, 1996. 2710
Tejada-Guibert, A., Johnson, S., and Stedinger, J.: The Value of Hydrologic Information in
Stochastic Dynamic Programming Models of a Multireservoir System, Water Resour. Res.,
31, 2571–2579, 1995. 271730
Tilmant, A. and van der Zaag, P.: Towards good governance of hydraulic works: A review of
management instruments, in: EGU Meeting, Vienna, Austria, 2006. 2723
Tilmant, A., Duckstein, L., Persoons, E., and Vanclooster, M.: Comparison of fuzzy and non-
2724
HESSD
3, 2707–2733, 2006
Operation of
reservoir resources
A. Tilmant et al.
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
J I
J I
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Printer-friendly Version
Interactive Discussion
EGU
fuzzy optimal reservoir operating policies, J. Water Resour. Plann. Manage., 128, 390–398,
2002a. 2718
Tilmant, A., Fortemps, P., and Vanclooster, M.: Effect of averaging operators in fuzzy optimisa-
tion of reservoir operation, Water Resour. Manage., 16, 1–22, 2002b. 2718
WCD: World Commission on Dams. Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-5
making, Earthscan Publications Ltd, London and Sterling, VA, 2000. 2709
Yakowitz, S.: Dynamic programming application in water resources, Water Resour. Res., 18,
673–696, 1982. 2717
Zimmermann, H.: Fuzzy set theory and its applications, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1991. 2712
2725
HESSD
3, 2707–2733, 2006
Operation of
reservoir resources
A. Tilmant et al.
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
J I
J I
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Printer-friendly Version
Interactive Discussion
EGU
Table 1. Relative importance according to Saaty (1980).
Relative Definition
importance
1 Equal importance
3 Weak importance of one over the other
5 Strong importance of one over the other
7 Demonstrated importance
9 Absolute importance
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values
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Table 2. Reservoir objectives.
Hydropower Storage Downstream Future
generation Control irrigation operation
µO1,t µO2,t µO3,t Dn−1
rt + + + +
st + +
rt+1 +
st+1 + +
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Table 3. Weighting coefficients – utilitarist approach.
Hydropower Storage Downstream Future
generation control irrigation operation
ωj 0.18 0.35 0.35 0.12
2728
HESSD
3, 2707–2733, 2006
Operation of
reservoir resources
A. Tilmant et al.
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
J I
J I
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Printer-friendly Version
Interactive Discussion
EGU
Table 4. Aggregation parameters.
Egalitarian Utilitarian Egalitarian
Veto-power Dictatorship
Model I Model II Model III
p p→−∞ p=1 p→+∞
ωj no yes no
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Table 5. Simulated performances.
Egalitarian Utilitarian Egalitarian
Veto-power Dictatorship
Model I Model II Model III
δ [%] 68 70 74
β [%] 95 85 34
γ [GWh] 2195 2214 2247
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Fig. 1. Group decision-making approaches and their aggregation operators.
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Fig. 2. Simulated storage levels for different group-decision making approaches.
2732
HESSD
3, 2707–2733, 2006
Operation of
reservoir resources
A. Tilmant et al.
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
J I
J I
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Printer-friendly Version
Interactive Discussion
EGU
Fig. 3. Representation of the FSDP methodology.
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